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UTILITY RESTRUCTURING

Electric Utility Restructuring:
What Does It Mean for Residential and
Small Retail Consumers in Maine?
by Lewis Tagliaferre & Susan Greenwood
On March 1, 2000, Maine will offer electric power through open competition, a restructuring that
poses both advantages and disadvantages to residential and small retail consumers in Maine. While
electric restructuring in Maine has been thoughtfully developed, the basic question of whether
electricity rates will be lower for the average consumer will remain uncertain for some time. This
uncertainty is linked not only to Maine’s electricity rate bidding process but also to potentially
oligopolistic national trends. In addition, whether individual consumers achieve savings in their
electricity costs will be determined, in part, by their choice of electricity supplier. While some
consumers may prefer a higher-cost supplier because of the value-added services that accompany
that option, others may make no choice and, by default, receive the standard option—where rates
are determined by the Maine Public Utilities Commission (MPUC).

-

In this article, the

authors describe the factors that initiated the push toward restructuring, the history of the enabling
legislation, and relevant portions of the MPUC’s Consumer Education Program. To consumers,
the authors emphasize the importance of aggregation—clusters of buying groups—and detail how
the nature of open competition may affect them. In particular, they call attention to the additional
services that may be provided by electricity suppliers. Finally, in discussing the implications of
deregulation, they lay out the uncertainties that lie ahead for consumers, policymakers, and
regulators as Maine opens itself up to competition in the electric power market.
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Portions of this article appear in Surviving Utility Deregulation, an
executive report to the Electrical Contracting Foundation, in press.

THE RUSH TO COMPETE

n May 29, 1997, Governor Angus S. King signed into law
a major reform of Maine’s electric utility structure (Revised
Maine Statutes Annotated, Title 35-A). As a result, by March 1,
2000, Central Maine Power, Bangor Hydro-Electric Company,
and Maine Public Service will no longer own power-generating
plants, although they will continue to operate and maintain the
transmission and distributions systems that deliver energy to
homes and businesses, and they will continue to be regulated by
the Maine Public Utilities Commission (MPUC).
Maine is one of twenty-three states to have passed such laws.
Three more have negotiated competition with incumbent utilities.
In general, roughly half of those states with high-cost power
want to open up retail competition sooner, and the other half with
low-cost power want more time for study and planning.
Regardless of the pace, electric utilities all over the country are
being required to make available to customers alternative sources
of power and related energy services. These changes are being
driven by the Energy Policy Act of 1992, the implementation
decisions of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, and state
policy enactments—all of which resulted from the organized
efforts of consumer groups and large energy users to obtain the
benefits of more competition.
Monthly summaries available from the Department of Energy
predict that by the year 2005 most states will have opened the
market for retail choice of electricity to almost all categories of
consumers. By then the Department estimates that about one-half
of commercial and industrial users and one-fourth of residential
consumers will have switched power suppliers. In 1996, Rhode
Island, California, and Pennsylvania passed the first deregulation
legislation; those states that adopted deregulation early will have
made the conversion from regulated monopolies to open
competition by the year 2002. But the pace and the methodology
vary between states; they are moving in uncoordinated fits and
starts, and are organizing several different forms of retail
competition. In Maine, as retail electric competition goes into effect
on March 1, 2000, large and small consumers will be able to
choose the supplier of their electricity and related services.

O

HISTORICAL MILESTONES LEADING
TO RESTRUCTURING

he trend toward utility competition was initiated with the
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)
oil embargo of 1973, which stimulated passage of the federal
Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act of 1978 (PURPA). After the
enactment of PURPA, Maine’s policymakers rigorously adopted its
provisions. Unfortunately, the implementation of these provisions
led to spiraling high electric rates after a long period of stable low
costs (for additional background information on PURPA and its
effects in Maine, see Lee and Hill (1995)). Thus, for Maine and
other states, the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPAct) provided relief
in establishing mechanisms for utility competition. The EPAct
exempted wholesale power generators from the Public Utility
Holding Company Act of 1935 and established rules for creating
a competitive national wholesale power market. The EPAct also
enabled utilities to transfer their assets to holding companies and
set up unregulated subsidiaries—the exempt wholesale generators.
In their summary of the evolution of Maine’s electric utility
industry, Lee and Hill (1995) note that the transition from an
electrical monopoly towards an industry with significant
competition was driven by two events: the overestimation of the
growth in demand for electricity, and the erratic price of oil. These
events, coupled with Maine’s high electricity costs and the intent to
shift the risk of future investments in generation technology from
ratepayers to shareholders, pushed Maine toward the 1997 passage
of Title 35-A of Maine Revised Statutes Annotated, Chapter 32,
Electric Industry Restructuring.

T

THE RESTRUCTURING LAW

aine’s Electric Industry Restructuring law offers consumers
the right to purchase generation services directly from
competitive providers, with the opportunity to form groups of
consumers or aggregations. The competitive providers themselves
are exempt from most of the previous regulations, and detailed
procedures govern the licensing of competitive electricity
providers. In order to be licensed, they must demonstrate legal and
financial responsibility, show evidence of their ability to enter into
binding arrangements with transmission and distribution utilities,
and at least 30% of their energy portfolios must come from
renewable resources.

M
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The standard-offer service, sometimes called the default provision,
is the option customers will get if they choose not to buy
their power from a competitive provider.
Under the restructuring law Maine’s three investor-owned
utilities were required to divest themselves of all generation assets
and generation-related business activites. As a result, the assets
owned by Central Maine Power, Bangor Hydro-Electric Company,
and Maine Public Service have been purchased, respectively, by the
FPL Group (Florida Power and Light), PP&L, Inc. (Pennsylvania
Power and Light), and WPS (Wisconsin Public Service) Power
Delivery, Inc. These new owners are classified as exempt wholesale
generators by the EPAct, which frees them from certain financial and
legal restrictions stipulated in the Public Utilities Holding Company
Act of 1935. Also, they do not have to be licensed through the
MPUC regulatory process as do retail electricity suppliers. Thus,
power generation is deregulated.
Maine’s investor-owned utilities will be regulated only in the
transmission and distribution of electricity (sometimes referred to
as T&D or “wires” companies or, more formally, as local
distribution companies (LDC)). On the itemized billing that went
into effect January 1, 1999, this local distribution cost is referred
to as the delivery service charge. On the other hand, billing and
metering services, which are also provided by transmission and
distribution utilities, are subject to competition, and are governed
by consumer protection standards. Utilities also were given the
means to recover “stranded costs”—legitimate and verifiable costs
made unrecoverable by restructuring. A reasonable opportunity to
recover these costs is provided by MPUC through the rates of the
transmission and distribution utilities. The restructuring law also
addresses the issue of cross-subsidies—benefits accruing to utility
affiliates as they venture into new markets, such as heating, airconditioning, and ventilation. The law prohibits the sharing of
market information between affiliated and nonaffiliated
competitors and the distribution utility.
A standard-offer service, or default electric rate, is made
available to all consumers as part of the competitive choice
process. Standard-offer service guarantees a source of electric
power to those consumers who do not elect an alternative
provider. By law, consumers are protected against unfair and
deceptive business practices—the so-called “bait and switch” and

66 · MAINE POLICY REVIEW · Fall 1999

“slamming” tactics. However, to assist consumers in making
informed decisions, MPUC is also required to implement a
consumer education program.
THE STANDARD-OFFER SERVICE

he standard-offer service, sometimes called the default
provision, is the option customers will get if they choose not
to buy their power from a competitive provider. Different states
have different ways of offering this provision. For example,
Massachusetts initially chose to have one set rate for all
customers. In contrast, Maine has a more complex system, which
is divided into three major categories—residential and small
nonresidential, medium nonresidential, and large nonresidential.
The system, designed by the MPUC, initiated a bidding process
on August 2, 1999. MPUC will choose three or more firms to
provide standard offer service in areas previously served by the
state’s investor-owned utilities. On the other hand, the
consumer-owned utilities may conduct the bidding process
themselves. These bids are due by October 1, 1999, with a
decision to be made by December 1, 1999.

T

THE CONSUMER EDUCATION PROGRAM

he Consumer Education Program’s Comprehensive Plan is
funded through a legislatively approved, four-year assessment of
the transmission and distribution utilities, and is consonant with the
general funding for the MPUC. The Plan is an impressive document
detailing over two years’ worth of educational activities to inform
Maine citizens of the intricacies of electric utility restructuring.
Major target audiences include residential customers, especially lowincome persons, the elderly, the functionally illiterate, the hearing
and visually impaired, and small commercial consumers including
nonprofit organizations, churches, and municipalities.
An extensive plan to educate consumers through direct mail,
media advertising, Website, and community outreach is now in
operation with a budget of $1,423,000. The first and second of
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four planning phases have already occurred with the completion
of some initial marketing research, and with itemized billing—
the latter of which began in January 1999. The important third
phase begins in September 1999, with educational strategies
leading up to the actual implementation of electric choice in
March 2000. Finally, the fourth phase will consist of a
postcampaign evaluation and the provision of ongoing support.
Beginning in January 2000, the Plan will feature a presentation
entitled, “Choice Month is Coming—Here’s Help,” and from
March 2000 to October 2000, the presentation will be, “Choice
is Here—What You Need to Know.”
THE INITIAL INTENTIONS OF RETAIL COMPETITORS

At present Maine is somewhat uncomfortably poised on the
eve of restructuring. We say “uncomfortably” because of the
aforementioned major issues remaining to be resolved between
now and March 1, 2000, when open competition for marketing
retail electric power begins. This discomfort manifested itself in a
recent survey of potential retail competitors conducted in March April, 1999. C-E-C Group of Springfield, VA, in conjunction with
the University of Maine’s Department of Sociology, surveyed the
retail competitors who had registered in Maine to market power, an
initial step prior to the more complex licensing procedure.
Registrants received a two-page questionnaire asking them to
comment on a variety of issues, including their marketing plans and
their reactions to components of the restructuring law. Eventually,
nine out of a possible ten companies returned the survey. The
results reveal the marketers’ attitudes as well as the potential services
they intend to offer to consumers.
In addition to competitive electric power, the marketers
indicated that they planned to offer energy usage audits and
efficient equipment retrofits financed through performance
contracts, energy system leasing, operation and maintenance, power
quality and reliability improvements, telecommunications services,
real-time pricing, security alarm systems, and energy information,
including usage analysis, consolidated billing, and automatic
metering. Not all marketers will be offering all these services, so
both residential and small business consumers will have to carefully
evaluate these offerings to find the best combination for their needs,
including the kilowatt rate per hour.
In regard to attitude, the marketers indicated they had specific
concerns about the components of the standard offer and the green

requirements; they expressed some worry over whether the market
in Maine would truly be competitive, and whether Maine
consumers would understand the complexities of the issue. We
assume that the MPUC’s Consumer Education Plan will alleviate
some of these worries. However, one important option for
consumers to be aware of is the opportunity to join an aggregation.
AGGREGATION: A VALUABLE CONSUMER OPTION

An aggregation is a buying group—consumers clustered by an
aggregator, a legal entity, for the purchase of a commodity service.
Since residential and small commercial users may not be profitable
for energy suppliers at the market-clearing competitive price,
aggregations will increase the negotiating clout of these users. The
vertically integrated investor-owned utilities, municipal utilities, and
rural electric cooperatives have previously performed this function.
In today’s restructured power market, other entities could perform
this function. An aggregator could be a local chamber of
commerce, a church district, a homeowners’ association, a city
government, or a school district. However, after an aggregator signs
a contract with a competitive supplier, all its members may be
obligated to use that supplier for the term of the contract (unless it
is made a voluntary transaction).
In Maine, seven retail power marketers are now licensed
through the MPUC as aggregators/brokers: Energy Atlantic, LLC
(Presque Isle); Energy Options Consulting Group, LLC (Wayne);
Enron Energy Services, Inc. (Dublin, Ohio); Maine Health and
Higher Educational Facilities Authority (MHHEFA); Maine
Municipal Bond Bank, doing business as Maine PowerOptions
(Augusta); SYNERNET, Inc., doing business as PowerNet, Inc.
(Portland); and Weil and Howe, Inc. (Augusta). Through MHHEFA,
all health and higher education facilities are eligible to join, and a
bill has recently passed the legislature to admit other nonprofit
organizations, such as churches. However, the legislature reversed its
earlier policy of allowing individuals who work for those facilities
to also join. In 1998, Maine PowerOptions began aggregation
with heating oil, and has initiated electricity aggregation. This
aggregation will make membership available to municipalities and
school districts throughout the state—with considerable electricity
cost savings. The MPUC’s Comprehensive Plan notes that most of
Maine’s businesses are small- to medium-sized and often have fewer
than fifty employees. Therefore, aggregation is a valuable option for
these businesses, one that will produce lower electric rates as
economies of scale come into play.
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IMPLICATIONS OF ELECTRIC
UTILITY RESTRUCTURING

lthough moving spasmodically, practically all states have
embarked on plans to open retail competition of power and
related services to all consumers. However, the transition to retail
competition must tread several politically sensitive issues that
consumers as stakeholders should understand. These issues include:

A

• trying to preserve low rates for consumers who have
traditionally benefitted from them; while encouraging
a competitive market;
• allowing states the freedom to deal with the issue
of stranded costs;
• protecting consumers from unfair business practices,
such as cross-subsidies; and,
• accommodating the popular demand for “green power.”
For consumers, we note that—while low cost electricity
provided the main impetus for legislative restructuring—the
bottom line may not be the cost of electricity. Some consumers may
be willing to pay higher prices when those prices include
performance contracts and other additional services. A performance
contract would mean that the power marketer—the supplier of
electricity—shared the savings of energy efficiency building
retrofits with the consumer. For example, a supplier might offer to
repair or replace home electrical wiring as part of its marketing
strategy (this is similar to telephone companies’ wiring protection
plans). Or, as consumers state their preference for environmentally
sensitive “green” power, they may be willing to pay higher costs.
(However, if consumers switch suppliers for environmental reasons,
that switch does not necessarily mean they will receive green
power. Indeed, it may only mean that more electricity from green
sources will go to the regional grid and not specifically to the
individual consumer. Still, an individual choice for green power
encourages its increased use.)
In states that adopted deregulation earlier than Maine,
electricity suppliers have begun to offer nonutility services, such as
property insurance, health benefits, fuel, overnight delivery, wireless
telephone service, and personal computer and office supplies
(Tagliaferre, 1999). Evaluating the proposed benefits of these new
value-added services can be confusing and vexing to the
uninformed buyer.
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In the initial surveys taken to aid the MPUC in its
development of a Consumer Education Program, the agency tested
real knowledge—based on answers to true and false questions—
and found that residential and commercial customers’ knowledge
about restructuring is very weak. This lack of knowledge is
reflected in the Washington International Energy Group’s 1999
statement that, to many people, what is happening in the electric
industry really doesn’t matter because, at this point, consumers are
not interested in choice.
However, consumers soon will have a compelling need to
become interested. As companies develop into national competitors
and move into different states to establish new consumer bases and
effect mergers or acquisitions, consumers will only benefit if they
are educated. Overall we expect that the transition to a truly
competitive market will be protracted and costly to many firms for
two reasons: the lack of ability to merge corporate cultures
successfully and efficiently, and the tendency to control uncertain
outcomes by overplanning.
MERGING CORPORATE CULTURES

orporate cultures will be merging in Maine and elsewhere
as out-of-state companies purchase generation assets as well as
other holdings of formerly state-owned utilities. Such mergers
offer the benefits of a wider base of operations, increased
knowledge, and additional human resources. Yet to achieve greater
economies of scale, they bring the burdens of a more impersonal
corporate culture and a loss of jobs through downsizing. To some
extent, the Energy East Corporation—with its purchase in June
1999 of CMP Group’s transmission lines and other assets—
will face this challenge (CMP Group is the parent company of
Central Maine Power).
In addressing the potential problems of mergers, Feldman and
Spratt (1999) make three trenchant points: first, because policy
statements alone are not strong enough to create cultural acceptance,
companies should focus on value-driving actions; second, emphasis
should be placed on role modeling desired behavior rather than on
an attempt to change people’s belief systems; and, third, swift action
is needed to effect the cultural merger. If these goals are met,
consumers will benefit directly as companies provide reliable service
at prices achieved through economies of scale, and indirectly as the
overall economic climate is improved.
This topic might well be addressed in an extended educational
effort through the MPUC’s Consumer Education Plan, especially
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. . . the bottom line may not be the cost of electricity.
Some consumers may be willing to pay higher prices when those prices
include performance contracts and other additional services.
since knowledge of Maine’s business culture is an important,
though often unrecognized, issue. After talking with many
businesspeople involved in mergers and acquisitions, we realize that
different business cultural norms exist throughout the country.
These norms represent the unwritten protocols of how to do
business—with whom do you speak first, whose opinion needs to
be solicited, and who shouldn’t be ignored—which are different
across companies, industries, and geographic regions. Thus, the task
for policymakers becomes how to account for this subjective level
of change: Will policies designed to benefit Mainers (such as the
“green” requirement that retail electricity suppliers need to have
30% of their portfolio in renewable resources) scare away what
might be healthy competition? While it is probably too early to
know the answer to this question, we note the Edison Electric
Institute’s warning: “The undertaking of retail access will require
more time and effort than any of the participants anticipate” (1999:
141). We believe that part of Maine’s educational effort needs to
be geared toward helping businesses understand that their
corporate culture needs to change—as the Edison Electric Institute
recommends—from “top to bottom,” and that employees “should
be taught to embrace competition and [to realize] that restructuring
is not about losing customers” (144). Business culture, the
importance of which is often unacknowledged, needs to be dealt
with as a major issue affecting successful mergers and acquisitions.
THE HAZARD OF OVERPLANNING

he transition process, as it applies to mergers—and
restructuring in general—can be confusing to consumers. Our
own experience in dealing with consumers’ puzzled and sometimes
hostile reactions to restructuring is supported by Crandall and Ellig
(1997), who note initial pessimistic forecasts about the benefits of
restructuring. Also, in examining the policy implications of
restructuring, they write: “Legislators and regulators should resist
the temptation to elaborately plan either the structure of markets or
the transition process” (67). They believe that markets will benefit
consumers if the markets are allowed to develop without

T

overregulation. Likewise, Feldman and Spratt (1999) argue that any
corporate transition strategy should be based on economic criteria
rather than on statements of company vision or values.
Nationwide, some impatient energy users are strongly
lobbying for new federal legislation to accelerate and standardize
deregulation among the states. Reorganizations have been
instituted by utility executives in reaction to their real and
anticipated loss of monopoly franchises. They must develop new
sources of revenue to compensate stockholders for sales lost to
reduced energy prices and aggressive competitors. While these
developments may not affect Maine initially, as companies develop
a nationwide base, the marketing of new services by utilities may
ultimately impact residential and small commercial users.
AN UNCERTAIN HORIZON

arlier we listed the major aspects of the MPUC’s
Comprehensive Plan for the Consumer Education Program. As
documented by the Edison Electric Institute (1999), consumer
education has been a major focus in states that have already
deregulated. Consumer education is important in establishing
successful competitive markets. The initial findings of the MPUC’s
consumer research reveal low levels of awareness coupled with
concern about the reliability of service and cost. Some consumers
who live in rural regions are worried that their area will receive
inadequate attention (this finding emerged from a focus group held
in northern Maine). Across all focus groups, it appears that
consumers mistakenly believe if they decline to take any action,
nothing will change. The Comprehensive Plan recommends that
consumers understand the consequences of taking no action: by
default, they will be accepting the standard-service offer. Yet the
MPUC also emphasizes that any benefits to the consumer will
evolve over time rather than being instantaneous, and may reflect
the choices consumers make in an uncertain landscape.
While some consumers may realize immediate benefits from
deregulation, Annette Arribas of Energy Atlantic believes that
residential customers won’t benefit much from restructuring unless

E
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. . . economic improvement could well depend on the ability
of the MPUC to be both vigilant and flexible.
they join an aggregation. Echoing that sentiment is Douglas
Stevenson of Energy Options Consulting Group. He also emphasizes
that unaggregated consumers must understand the metering and
billing procedures, which are subject to competition. The MPUC will
“establish minimum standards necessary to protect consumers of
these services and codes of conduct governing the relationship
among transmission and distribution utilities providing electric billing
and metering services” (Maine Revised Statutes, 1997). However,
Stevenson’s comments highlight the complexity of the situation for
the unaggregated consumer. For example, consumers should ask if
their potential competitive service provider uses a standard load
characteristic. If a standard load characteristic—similar to an average
rate of use or estimate—is used (rather than exact metering), then
residential customers may not realize any benefit or may even lose
money. Thus, the term “unbundling” ultimately means that consumers
have to compare prices for electricity, billing and metering
services, transmission and distribution, and other associated
options—a daunting task for the uninitiated. (For this purpose,
changes in billing documentation went into effect January 1, 1999,
to provide consumers with a detailed cost breakdown.)
As noted earlier, standard-offer service bids will be chosen on
December 1, 1999. Essentially, this waiting period buys time for the
consumer to become more knowledgeable, since some retail
electricity suppliers may wait to find out what the standard offer is
before selling power in Maine. On the other hand, an atmosphere of
uncertainty is created for the potential bidders. While the process of
requesting standard-offer bids is in itself a process fostering
competition, it still creates uncertainty on the part of those entities
licensed to retail power and those who might want to establish a
customer base in Maine. Maine’s process is very different from
Massachusetts, where initially the standard-offer service was so low
that it discouraged competition. Since January 1, 1999, competition
in Massachusetts has grown because of the increase in standard offer
rates. (See a fuller discussion of the Massachusetts situation in Edison
Electric Institute, 1999.) At this time it is difficult to know how much
residential and small retail consumers will benefit from the potential
competition. And it is difficult to know whether there will be enough
firms to provide healthy competition. The C-E-C Group/University
of Maine survey conducted earlier revealed mixed feelings about the
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procedure for soliciting standard-offer bids. Only time will tell whose
vision is more accurate. At this point we believe that the MPUC’s
work has provided for healthy competition without the overplanning
deemed detrimental to the transition process.
BACK TO THE FUTURE?

e find it tempting to invoke some of the feelings behind the
statement, “the more things change, the more they stay the
same.” Perhaps that statement contains unwarranted pessimism.
Still, before the 1930s the United States had oligopolies—a few
powerful firms dominating the market—which provided essential
energy commodities. In 1935 the Public Utilities Holding
Companies Act allowed regulated monopolies to form in the
interest of consumers. Now a new electric power arena combining
aspects of both regulation and deregulation is forthcoming. Will
these efforts all over the country, including in Maine, produce a
healthy competition with lower electric costs, or will the more
powerful new energy services companies take over the market and
move perilously close to the earlier oligopolistic situation? After
all, consumers have had the recent examples of large nationwide
firms putting local stores out of business and corporate farms
replacing family farms. Will a healthy balance between strong
competing groups prevail, or will the balance shift toward
oligopoly? Will utility merger mania be the order of the day in
Maine as it is in other states?
One disadvantage to size is that bigger companies haven’t
established a track record at the local level. Hence, discrepancies
between perception and reality may come into play as new markets
develop. For example, attitudinal research by Tagliaferre (1998)
reveals that some electrical/mechanical contractors perceive a
threat by the new and aggressive marketing strategies of
competitive service providers, but the reality may be that these
providers don’t have the needed expertise to do business at the
local level. Tagliaferre’s research also strongly suggests that the
electrical/mechanical contractors need to increase their ability to
keep loyal customers for a continuing viable business. This
challenge means more creativity and more value-added services in
order to compete.

W
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Since Maine—through its legislative and regulatory planning
and decisionmaking—has studied energy restructuring in other
states, we can optimistically say that a lot has been done to ensure
healthy competition. The manifest function of restructuring is to
provide lower cost electricity, but new ventures almost always
contain unforeseen events or latent functions, and legislation often
produces unintended results. Will unexpected factors emerge?
Certainly the legislature and the MPUC need to be prepared for
such eventualities. Both the Washington International Energy
Group (1999) and the Edison Electric Institute (1999) succinctly
state that the devil is in the details.
Again, the standard offer service comes into play as the
MPUC may have to walk a tightrope here. If the bids for electric
power are too low, competition may be discouraged. Yet the
MPUC does have the option of setting a price should all the
bids be unacceptable. We call attention to Maine’s on-going
dialogue about what will bring greater benefits: a low rate (which
would help consumers), or a higher rate (which would encourage
competition and business endeavors).
Thomas Welch, chairman of the MPUC, reviewed the current
situation in a personal communication with Susan Greenwood (May
1, 1999). He noted that it is important to distinguish among three
things: energy-producing companies and the people who own
generating assets; transmission and distribution companies; and
vertical reintegration. Welch expects some attempts at consolidation
in all three areas. He indicated this would be mildly troublesome
among energy-producing companies and the people who own
generating assets—he would not like to see just two big players
selling power. However, Welch believes that some consolidation
among transmission and distribution companies might allow these
companies to achieve a reduction in overhead through greater
economies of scale; regulators, in turn, would need to assess the
value of such efficiencies. In terms of the third area, Maine law
ultimately prevents vertical reintegration. Welch believes that, in
themselves, mergers and consolidations are not bad; each one needs
to be considered on its own merits, and any ensuing layoffs are
coming because of underlying efficiency corrections that need to be
made. However, echoing others’ concerns, he notes there may be
problems with quality of service. Finally, Welch believes that the
Maine structure is ideal for healthy competition because there are
safeguards to prevent abuses of market power. As yet, he sees no
trend in Maine toward such abuses, in part because the market is
immature. His statement acknowledges the fact that thus far, because

the bids for the standard-service offer have not yet been decided
upon, only several retail electricity suppliers have expressed interest
in doing business in Maine.
CONCLUSIONS

e began the last section with a mild tone of pessimism, but
we hope the pessimism serves as a reminder that opening the
market to retail electricity suppliers is only the beginning of a long,
complex procedure. The Edison Electric Institute’s (1999) studies
of four states show that it is hard to anticipate all eventualities and
that the best strategy is to stay flexible. Crandall and Ellig’s (1997)
studies of five major industries—natural gas, telecommunications,
airlines, trucking, and railroads—reveal that the benefits of
deregulation ultimately outweigh the burdens. Initially, pessimism
was the dominant attitude at the beginning of deregulation in all
of these industries. Yet deregulation and customer choice resulted
in lower prices, competitive markets evolved in response to
consumer needs, and innovative products eventually became
available for popular consumption.
It is probably safe to assume that the same outcomes can
prevail through restructuring in Maine. Because Maine is a rural
state and because electricity rates will probably not reach the same
low levels as some other areas of the country, the residential and
small business consumer will most likely receive only modest
benefits in the foreseeable future. The major benefit may be an
indirect one, as we do predict that the Maine economy will
improve overall because of electric utility restructuring. Yet
economic improvement could well depend on the ability of the
MPUC to be both vigilant and flexible. If the MPUC tracks
specific outcomes—prices lowered or raised, jobs gained or lost—
in all deregulated industries in Maine, that information would
provide useful guidelines in a continuing assessment of the electric
restructuring process and its effects on residential and small
business consumers. -
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